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ANTITRUST DECISIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
IN THE 1984-85 TERM
WILLIAM

M.

HANNAY'

While the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
decided a number of antitrust cases during the 1984-85 term, the most
important antitrust law relating to the Seventh Circuit was made in
Washington, D.C.
SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS

A.

Res Judicataand PretrialDiscovery

In a 7-to-O decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Marrese v. American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons.2 Earlier, by a 5-to-4 en banc vote, the Seventh
Circuit, speaking through Judge Posner, had issued the court's third
opinion in the Marrese case, articulating an expanded version of the doctrine in res judicata and expressed its views on the appropriate use of
3
pretrial discovery.
The case involved an antitrust suit brought by two physiciansTreister and Marrese-against the American Academy of Orthopaedic
Surgeons for rejecting their applications for membership. Earlier, the
physicians had brought separate state court actions which were dismissed. The Illinois Appellate Court held that Treister's complaint
failed to state a cause of action under state law because Academy membership was not an "economic necessity."'4 The Illinois Supreme Court
denied leave to appeal. 5 Marrese's suit was also dismissed on the same
grounds. Both doctors then brought antitrust actions in federal district
court seeking damages and injunctive relief under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Academy moved for dismissal on the ground of resjudi1. Mr. Hannay is a partner at Schiff, Hardin & Waite and an Adjunct Professor at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
2. 105 S.Ct. 1327 (1985), rev'g, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
3. The original panel opinion and a subsequent opinion on rehearing were reported at 706
F.2d 1488 (7th Cir. 1983) and 692 F.2d 1083 (7th Cir. 1982). The earlier Seventh Circuit opinions
are discussed in Fair, Antitrust: 1983-84 Seventh CircuitDevelopments, 61 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 183,
199-201 (1985).
4. Treister v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 78 Il.App. 3d 746, 755-56, 396
N.E.2d 1225 (1979).
5. 79 Il1. 2d 630 (1980).
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cata, but the district court (Shadur, J.) twice denied that motion and
denied the Academy's request to have his ruling certified for immediate
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Discovery was begun and plaintiffs
sought the Academy's records relating to all denials of membership between 1970 and 1980. The Academy refused, even after the district court
issued a protective order limiting access. The trial court held the Academy in criminal contempt and fined it $10,000.
On appeal, from the contempt judgment, a panel of the Seventh Circuit twice reversed. In the meantime, the case had been reassigned to
another district court (Plunkett, J.) who certified the district court order
denying the Academy's motion to dismiss on resjudicata grounds. The
appeals were consolidated for en banc hearing. Judge Posner's opinion
commanded a 5-vote majority for reversal of the district court's discovery order but only a plurality for his rationale which was that the action
was barred because plaintiffs could have raised their antitrust claims in
the state court action under the Illinois Antitrust Statute or brought a
federal antitrust suit in federal court and joined their state law causes of
action as pendent claims.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further consideration of Illinois State Preclusion Law. Justice O'Connor, writing for
the Court, pointed out that under the full faith and credit statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1738, a federal court "generally is required to consider first the
law of the state in which the judgment was rendered to determine its
preclusive effect."' 6 Since analysis of state preclusion law may make it
unnecessary to determine if a federal court should refuse to give preclusive effect to a state court judgment, the Court remanded the case stating,
"we are unwilling to create a special exception to Section 1738 for federal
antitrust claims that would give state court judgments greater preclusive
7
effect than would the courts of the State rendering judgment."
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the Seventh Circuit erred when
it determined as a matter of federal law that the antitrust action was
barred by the earlier Illinois judgments based on the same facts. Chief
Justice Burger concurred in the judgment, but urged the formulation of a
federal rule to be applied in cases where state law is silent or indeterminate on the question of claim preclusion.
B.

Boycotts and Boating Associations

The Supreme Court has, at least temporarily, torpedoed an antitrust
6. Marrese, 105 S. Ct. at 1332.
7. Id. at 1334.
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action against a trade association by a manufacturer whose product was
denied certification. In Moore v. BoatingIndustry Associations,8 the Seventh Circuit upheld a jury verdict finding Section 1 liability from the
trade association's failure to employ "due process" in carrying out its
product certification program. In a memorandum opinion issued October 15, 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case "for further
consideration in light of Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific
Stationery & PrintingCo .... "9
In the Northwest Wholesale Stationers case, the Court had held that
a member's expulsion from a joint buying cooperative is not subject to
per se invalidation under Section 1 of the Sherman Act as a group boycott or concerted refusal to deal, absent a showing "that the cooperative
possesses market power or exclusive access to an element essential to effective competition."' 10 The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's finding of
per se liability which was based on the theory that the cooperative failed
to afford procedural protections, such as notice and a hearing, to permit
the member to challenge the expulsion.
The Supreme Court concluded that, unlike the situation in Silver v.
New York Stock Exchange," there was no statutory mandate for industry self-regulation which was such an essential part of the statutory
scheme that the Sherman Act could be construed as having been partially
repealed. Only where such a self-regulatory scheme exists is Silver's concern for adequate procedural safeguards necessary to accommodate the
important national policy.of promoting effective and fair self-regulation.
The correct analysis is one under the Rule of Reason unless the market
power element referred to above is present. Because the Ninth Circuit
failed to evaluate the challenged conduct under the Rule of Reason, the
case was remanded for further consideration.
In Moore v. Boating Industry Associations, the Seventh Circuit dealt
with a somewhat similar situation. Plaintiff Moore is a California-based
manufacturer of boat trailer lights. In 1974, plaintiff introduced a new
trailer light (Model No. 701) containing a number of desirable features,
particularly water resistance. The light was certified as being "salesworthy" by both the states of Virginia and California. 12 The California
8. 754 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1985).
9. 106 S. Ct. 218 (1985).
10. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613

(1985).
11. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
12. Pursuant to statute the Federal Department of Transportation has promulgated standards
regulating boat trailer lights. The DOT permits self-certification of compliance by the manufacturer.
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Highway Patrol, however, subsequently raised a question about the sufficiency of the brightness of the lights.
Defendants' alleged illegal conduct commenced in 1976 at about the
time of the defendant Associations' annual meeting. Just prior to the
1976 trade show, a letter alleging that plaintiff's light did not meet DOT
criteria was submitted to the Boating Industry Associations and its affiliate (defendant Trailer Manufacturers Association) by the Wesbar Corporation. Wesbar was an association member which manufactured a
taillight in direct competition with the Model No. 701. The Associations' administrator (defendant Reed) did not contact the plaintiff regarding this complaint, but instead, with no other information, informed
the Associations' membership that the Model No. 701 was not DOTapproved. Trailer Manufacturers were told orally that if they used the
Model No. 701 lights, the Associations would deny them certification.
Testimony established that the Associations' certification of a boat trailer
was essential to trailer marketing.
The next day after learning of the administrator's statement plaintiff
advised the Associations that the administrator was wrong and supplied
copies of the Model No. 701's Certification of Approval from the states
of California and Virginia. No correction was made by the Associations
during the meeting. A month later, the Associations sent a Model No.
701 light to a private testing laboratory, but the model appears to have
been improperly assembled (and there was even evidence of possible tampering by persons unknown). The private testing lab reported that the
Model No. 701 did not meet the DOT standards, and thereafter the Associations issued a "technical bulletin" stating that the Associations
would not certify any trailers using the Model No. 701. Litigation followed. At the conclusion of trial, a jury found that the defendant Associations and its administrator violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The court of appeals affirmed, pointing to evidence showing a sharp decrease in Model No. 701's sales to members of the Associations after the
technical bulletin was issued. From this evidence, the court concluded
that the certification program "possessed market power" which is an essential element in such a case. 13 The Seventh Circuit took the position
that there was little or no difference between a per se and a Rule of Reason analysis in group boycott cases and emphasized that the "complete
lack of due process afforded the plaintiffs in their product . . .in the
Two states (Virginia and California), however, require affirmative certification by state officials prior
to the sale of such lights.
13. Moore, 754 F.2d at 710.
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discriminatory manner in which the certification was denied" constituted
a Section 1 violation. 14 The court was particularly impressed by the undisputed evidence that the Associations had never taken action against
any light manufacturer where similar questions had been raised, including Wesbar, the very company that had complained about the Model No.
701.
Putting aside the open question as to whether the challenged conduct constitutes an antitrust violation in light of Northwest Wholesale
Stationers, the court's analysis of the conspiracy element seems weak.
Defendants' principal defense was the lack of a conspiracy. The Seventh
Circuit rejected this argument stating that "there is sufficient evidence in
the record to demonstrate that the members acted in response to the
threat by the defendants to revoke the members' certificate of approval
[for their trailers] if they used the Model 701...."' This part of the
court's analysis seems somewhat thin.
The jury was instructed, in connection with the conspiracy element
that "[a] trade association is by its nature involved in concerted action
...." The Seventh Circuit stated that this instruction should be read in
light of the rest of the instructions, which gave a fairly traditional statement of the conspiracy requirement. Nevertheless, the court went a long
way to reading out of existence the conspiracy element in trade association by stating as follows: "Trade organizations... are formed to represent the interests of their members and when the members agree to
establish a certification program ...in an attempt to regulate themselves
and their industry, they do engage in concerted action."' 16
Here, unlike earlier cases in which conspiracy was found, there was
no evidence of an agreement to do the particular acted issue. While there
is no dispute that the members of the Associations agreed to set up a
certification program, it appears that only one person made the decision
to act in an unfair and discriminatory fashion: the Association's administrator. From the court's description of the evidence, it appears that a
conspiracy between the Associations' administration and the rival manufacturer (Wesbar) may have occurred, but this was not the basis of the
court's affirmance. Rather, Judge Coffey, speaking for the majority, took
the position that the concerted action element was satisfied by the members' creation of a certification program (a totally neutral act in itself)
with antitrust liability triggered by the unfair or discriminatory conduct
14. Id. at 712.
15. Id. at 710
16. Id. at 714.
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of an Association employee acting alone. This seems to take conspiracy
law too far.
C.

Keogh Doctrine Immunity

In the matter of Wheat Rail Freight Rate Antitrust Litigation,17 the
Seventh Circuit re-examined the Keogh Doctrine and, over the objections
of plaintiff Shippers & Amicus Department of Justice, held that the doctrine retains continuing viability. Subsequently, a petition for a writ of
certiorari was filed.' 8 The petition is being held pending decision in a
similar case that the United States Supreme Court will hear this term in
Square D Company.19 The question to be addressed by the Supreme
Court is whether the decision in the Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern
Railway Co. 20 precludes shippers from recovering damages under the antitrust laws for the conspiratorial acts of a rate bureau and member carriers who knowingly violate the Interstate Commerce Act, related ICC
regulations, and their rate bureau agreement.
In Keogh, the Supreme Court had held that a shipper cannot recover
antitrust treble damages based upon a claim that, but for an alleged conspiracy among carriers, the shipper would have been entitled to transportation rates lower than the rates which were filed with and approved by
the ICC. The case involved an antitrust suit brought by a flax and excelsior shipper against railroad carriers, alleging that the carriers had conspired through their committee to fix excessive rates. Although the
challenged rates had been filed, suspended, investigated, and finally approved as reasonable and non-discriminatory by the ICC, the shippers
claimed that they were entitled to damages under the Sherman Act.
For a unanimous court, Justice Brandeis held that a private shipper
could not maintain such a cause of action. The Court believed this conclusion necessary in order to accommodate both antitrust and regulatory
goals, pointing to the alternative regulatory remedies available for the
allegedly injurious conduct at issue. First, the Court reasoned that the
shipper had no legal right to be charged a lesser rate because the ICC had
determined the specific rate. The Court felt that Congress intended the
procedures set forth in the ICC Act for challenging rates to be exclu17. 759 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1985).
18. Sub nom. Little Crow Milling Co., Inc. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., No. 85-112 (filed July
16, 1985).
19. See Square D Company v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1347 (2d Cir.
1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 57 (1985).

20. 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
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sive. 21 Consequently, the imposition of the existing rates had caused the
plaintiff no legally cognizable injury.
Second, the Court was concerned that maintenance of Keogh's action would give it a preference over other shippers who did not join the
suit. 22 Finally, the Court observed that plaintiff's damage theory rested

on speculation because there was no way of determining whether the
ICC would have approved the lower rate or whether it might have benefited Keogh at all. 23 The Keogh Doctrine was specifically affirmed by the
Supreme Court in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad.24 The Court stated
that:
The legal rights of a shipper against a carrier in respect to a rate are to
be measured by the published tariff. That rate until suspended or set
aside was for all purposes the legal rate between the shipper and carrier
and may
not be varied or enlarged either by contract or tort of the
25
carrier.

In Wheat Rail Freight Rate Antitrust Litigation, the defendant railroads had acted pursuant to an agreement approved by the ICC. Under
the Interstate Commerce Act, two or more rail carriers may enter into an
agreement relating to rates and will not be subject to antitrust liability
with respect to making or carrying out the agreement if it is submitted to
and approved by the ICC and if it is carried out under the conditions
required by the Commission. 26 In 1982, following several years of proceedings before the ICC with respect to the propriety of certain rates,
various wheat shippers filed the present suit in federal district court alleging that the railroads had lost their immunity from antitrust laws provided by § 10706(a)(2)(A) when they failed to follow the notice and
hearing requirements set forth in the original Agreement. The district
court (Marshall, J.) dismissed the shippers' antitrust damage claims on
the ground that the Keogh Doctrine impliedly immunized the railroads
from antitrust liability for their conduct. 27 On appeal, the shippers and
amicus, the U.S. Department of Justice, argued that the Keogh Doctrine
was no longer applicable to the facts of the case. Specifically, they argued that the Railroad Revitalization Regulatory Reform Act of 1976
(the "4R Act"), 28 changed the regulatory environment in which the rail21. Id. at 162.
22. Id. at 163.

23. Id. at 163-65.
24.
25.
26.
27.
1984).
28.

324 U.S. 439 (1945).
Id. at 453.
49 U.S.C. § 10706(a)(2)(A).
In re Wheat Rail Freight Rate Antitrust Litigation, 579 F. Supp. 517, 535-38 (N.D. Ill.
P.L. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31.
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roads operate from that under which they operated at the time of Keogh
thereby invalidating the doctrine's usefulness in the case. The Seventh
Circuit rejected that argument.
Under the 4R Act, the ICC no longer has the authority to determine
whether a rate is reasonable unless it first finds that the railroads at issue
have market dominance. Congress enacted the 4R Act to "reform...
the cartel structure of the industry resulting from the rate bureaus."' 29 In
turn, Congress mandated that the railroad industry "must be treated
more like a competitive industry with respect to antitrust policy."' 30 The
shippers and amicus argued that, in the absence of authority by the ICC
to declare these rates reasonable, the antitrust laws must be given greater
force than they were given in Keogh to govern the competition within the
carrier industry.
In rejecting this argument, the Seventh Circuit pointed out that,
while the 4R Act introduced a measure of market competition, "it is not
3
correct to say that ICC authority over rates is completely eliminated."1 '
While the 4R Act amended the ICC's authority to declare rates unreasonably high, the ICC's responsibility to determine whether rates unjustly discriminate against shippers, commodities, or geographic regions
remains unchanged.3 2 The Seventh Circuit concluded that
The 4R Act... has not so drastically altered the regulatory environment as to invalidate the principles operating behind the Keogh decision. Finally, in consideration of the interplay of Congressional
antitrust goals and Congressional regulatory goals leads us to conclude
that the regulatory policies governing
the railroads here are incompati33
ble with antitrust enforcement.

Having found that the ICC still maintains extensive jurisdiction
over railroad rates and that a successful antitrust suit would be "repugnant" to the operation of the regulatory scheme, the court held that the
conduct was impliedly immune.
The conduct at issue in the Square D Company case which will be
considered by the Supreme Court this term, is not markedly different
than that at issue in the Wheat Rail Freight case. Like the plaintiffs in
the Seventh Circuit case, the plaintiffs in Square D Company argued that
Keogh had been overruled by subsequent developments. In addition,
29. See S. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 28.

30. Id.
31. Wheat Rail Freight, 759 F.2d at 1311.
32. 49 U.S.C. § 10741(a), (b). See S. REP. No. 595, 94th Cong. 2nd Sess. 148, reprintedin 1976
U.S. CONG. & AD. NEWS 163.

33. Wheat Rail Freight, 759 F.2d at 1312.
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they argued that the facts alleged amounted to a broader conspiracy that
does not fall within the purview of Keogh. They claim that the defendants acted outside the scope of the ICC-authorized agreement by "engag-

'34
ing in conduct that either was not or could not be proved by the ICC."

The Second Circuit affirmed the application of Keogh. 3 5 The trial court
had rejected plaintiffs' argument about a "broader conspiracy" because
whatever the breadth of plaintiffs' allegations, "the complaint essentially
'36
focuses on what plaintiffs claim are unjust and excessive rates."
It is likely that the Supreme Court will reaffirm the Keogh Doctrine
in cases like Square D Company and Wheat Rail Freight where shippers
seek to imply the federal antitrust laws as an alternative vehicle for evaluating the reasonableness of rates filed with a regulatory agency.
D. Municipal Services and State Action
Three years ago, the Seventh Circuit addressed the question of the
immunity of a municipality for acts which might otherwise violate the
antitrust laws in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire.37 The case was
recently reviewed by the Supreme Court and affirmed on March 15,
1985.38 In 1978, the Supreme Court held that a municipal corporation is

not automatically exempt under the "state action" doctrine and that, if
challenged under the antitrust laws, must demonstrate that it is engaging
in the challenged activity pursuant to a "clearly articulated" state policy.3 9 The 1978 decision gave new prominence to the decision in Parker
v. Brown,4° in which the state action doctrine had first been enunicated.
The court's holding in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,4 1 complicated matters by rejecting the argument that a state "home
rule" statute satisfied the requirement of "clear articulation and affirmative expression."
In Town of Hallie, four townships in Wisconsin brought suit against
the City of Eau Claire, the owner of the only sewage treatment facility in
the area. The City refused to supply sewage treatment services to the
towns and would only supply such services to individual landowners in
the towns who would consent to become annexed by the City and pay for
34. See Square D. Company v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 153, 155
(W.D.N.Y. 1984).
35. Square D Company, 760 F.2d at 1349.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Square D Company, 596 F. Supp. at 155.
700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983).
105 S.Ct. 1713 (1985).
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
317 U.S. 341 (1943).
455 U.S. 40 (1982).
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sewage collection services from the City. While the towns could provide
sewage collection services, they had no means of sewage treatment or
disposal. The Seventh Circuit and later the Supreme Court held that this
conduct by the City constituted "state action" under Parker v. Brown
and was therefore exempt from the antitrust laws.
The Seventh Circuit held that it was not necessary that the state
direct or compel the challenged conduct but rather:
We hold that any municipality acting pursuant to clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed state policy which evidences an intent of
the legislature to displace competition with regulation-whether compelled, directed, authorized or in the form of a prohibition-is entitled
to antitrust immunity because
conduct pursuant to such a policy
42
would constitute state action.

Further, since sewage treatment was a "traditional municipal function," there was no requirement for the state to actively supervise the
muncipality's conduct.
The Supreme Court reiterated its view that the doctrine of Parkerv.
Brown arose from principles of federalism and state sovereignty and does
not necessarily require antitrust immunity from municipalities because
such entities are not "sovereigns." Rather, in order for a municipality to
obtain an antitrust exemption, the municipality must demonstrate that
its allegedly anti-competitive activities are authorized by the state "pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly
public service." The Supreme Court admitted that it has never stated
how clearly a state policy must be articulated for a municipality to be
able to establish that its anti-competitive activity constitutes state action
nor has it decided whether a municipality, like a private party, must be
actively supervised by the sovereign state in order to maintain exemption.
The plaintiff towns conceded that the Wisconsin statute authorizing
a municipality to provide sewage services appeared to contemplate allowing cities to refuse to provide services to those beyond its boundaries,
but contended that this was not a clear articulation of an intention to
replace competition. The Court concluded that competition need not be
referred to specifically if the conduct authorized by the statute logically
may result in an anti-competitive effect. Quoting Areeda and Turner, the
Court referred to a "regulatory structure that inherently displaced unfettered business freedom." 43 Thus, if a statute replaces competition inherently, it cannot be construed as being merely "neutral" within the
meaning of the City of Boulder. The state need not compel the munici42. Town of Hallie, 700 F.2d at 381.
43. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713, 1718 (1985).
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pality to act in any particular manner, for "we may presume, absent a
showing of the contrary, that the municipality acts in the public
interest." 44
Finally, with respect to active supervision the Court found no need
for the municipality to be actively supervised as long as the state has
articulated the policy to allow the municipality to provide for the function in question. Again, the Court would presume that the City is not
acting in furtherance of a private anti-competitive scheme. In addition,
as the Seventh Circuit noted, a requirement of state supervision would be
unwise and wasteful because a state would then be compelled to supervise all local actions if municipalities were to avoid antitrust exposure.
E. X-Rays, Price Fixing, and the Solicitor General
45
In Indiana Federation of Dentists v. Federal Trade Commission,
the Seventh Circuit handed the FTC a substantial setback in the health
care area, but the Supreme Court may alter that result. The Commission
had issued a cease and desist order prohibiting the association and its
member dentists from collectively refusing to comply with the request of
group dental health care insurers to submit copies of a patient's dental xrays along with the patient's insurance claim form. The Commission had
ruled that the association had engaged in an unfair method of competition in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, using a Rule of Reason
analysis. 46 The Seventh Court reversed.
Following the Seventh Circuit's reversal, the Commission requested
the Solicitor General of the United States to file a petition for writ of
certiorari on behalf of the Commission. When he declined to do so, the
FTC for the first time exercised its right to file its own petition. 47 On
October 14, 1985, the Supreme Court granted the petition and will consider the case this term.
In the IndianaFederation case, a group of Indiana dentists formed
the association as a labor union in an attempt to qualify for exemption
from the federal antitrust laws under Section 6 of the Clayton Act.
About one year after the association was formed, it adopted a "work
rule" which consisted of a campaign to refuse jointly to send to dental
insurance companies any dental x-rays or radiographs for pre-treatment
benefit determination. The dentists offered to allow dental representa44. Id. at 1720.
45. 745 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1984).
46. In re Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 101 F.T.C. 57, 179 (1983).
47. See Section 204(a) of the Magnuson-Moss warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act-U.S.C. § 204(a) (1982).
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380

tives from the companies to visit their offices and review records or examine patients, but they contended that the sending of x-rays to
insurance companies would result in attempted diagnosis of dental disease by laymen, which was a violation of Indiana state law and a violation of the dentists' duty to render the highest possible quality treatment
to their patients. An FTC administrative law judge declared this conduct to be a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act as a per se form of
boycott of cost containment mechanisms. While rejecting the applicability of the per se theory,4 8 the Commission analyzed the conduct under
the Rule of Reason and found that:
the practical implementation of the Work Rule was to refuse to cooperate with claims review programs which relied upon submission of xrays. The effect of [defendants'] conduct was to reduce competition
among dentists to cooperate with dental reimbursement plans and, by
doing so, to swart the efforts of individual insurance companies to contain costs by offering49 coverage for only the least expensive adequate
course of treatment.

This in turn resulted in "reducing or eliminating competition among
dentists as to their policy of dealing with third-party payers." 50 "By colluding, competitor dentists were freed to some extent from . . . market

forces because they knew other participants in the boycott would also
refuse to cooperate." 5 1
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the Commission had failed
to prove any impact on competition. Neither the ALJ nor the Commission found that the dentists' conduct harmed competition among insurers
in their efforts to provide group dental health coverage nor among dentists in their efforts to attract and treat patients covered by such insurance. To the Seventh Circuit, the Commission's finding of a federal
antitrust violation was based upon insufficient evidence and was merely
"a rubber-stamp approval of the group dental health care insurers' practice to formulate a course of dental treatment based solely upon dental xrays and an insurance claim form, in violation of established, accepted
and approved standards of quality dental care." '52 Writing for the panel,
Judge Coffey stated that refusal to submit x-rays was based on "legal,
'53
moral and ethical considerations" and not on economic grounds.
The Commission petitioned the Seventh Circuit for rehearing, which
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 101 F.T.C. at 168.
Id. at 171-72.
Id. at 173.
Id.
Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 745 F.2d at 1144.
Id. at 1139.
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was denied. Judge Fairchild (who had concurred in the panel decision
only with respect to the Commission's failure to prove the competitive
significance of the arrangement) voted to grant rehearing and Judges
Cudahy, Eschbach and Posner voted to grant rehearing en banc. In its
petition for a writ of certiorari, the Commission argued that the Seventh
Circuit acted contrary to National Society of ProfessionalEngineers v.
United States5 4 and created a safe harbor for boycotts organized by professional associations in furtherance of allegedly moral or ethical duties.
The Supreme Court's grant of the petition should give the Court an
opportunity to bring some needed clarification to the area of ethical defenses to the antitrust laws. Some of this confusion was engendered by
the National Society of ProfessionalEngineers decision and by the Sev55
enth Circuit's decision in Wilk v. American Medical Association.
APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO STANDARD-MAKING

In ECOS Electronics Corp. v. Underwriters Laboratory,5 6 the court
found no violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act in the activities of
Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (UL) in certifying the safety of a product
made by plaintiff's competitor. While the decision makes no new law, it
is a useful exercise in common sense.
Plaintiff ECOS manufactures an electrical outlet testing device in
competition with the Daniel Woodhead Company. Woodhead submitted
its device to UL which, after various modifications were made by Woodhead, certified the device as safe. Although actions against certifying
bodies such as UL are often brought by manufacturers who have been
denied approval, plaintiff ECOS never sought approval but rather based
its complaint on the ground that UL approved Woodhead's product.
ECOS alleged that it manufactured a device that was far superior to
Woodhead's product and which was correspondingly more expensive.
ECOS opposed Woodhead's application for approval, arguing that it
should not be certified because of certain limitations in its performance.
UL, nevertheless, granted a safety certification. ECOS then filed its action, claiming that UL's certifications of the less-expensive product denied ECOS "an unfettered opportunity" to offer [its] product in the
market because ECOS testers are substantially more expensive than
Woodhead's and purchasers will buy the least expensive "adequate"
54. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
55. 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2398 (1984). See Fair, supra note 3, at
187-89.
56. 743 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1178 (1985).
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product. The court through Judge Pell held that "plaintiff must show
either that it was barred from obtaining approval of its product on a
discriminatory basis from its competitors, or that the conduct as a whole
was manifestly anti-competitive and unreasonable," quoting an earlier
Sixth Circuit decision.5 7 Though claiming to be denied an "unfettered
opportunity" to sell its product, plaintiff ECOS was clearly interested in
"lessening competition" not enhancing it, the court noted.5 8 "ECOS
seeks to avoid the fetters of price competition by claiming that consumers
are injured when they choose inferior testers because of the price." 59
ECOS may not indirectly force Woodhead to raise its prices by forcing
UL to raise its standards.
The ultimate result of ECOS's logic would be to eliminate all standard-making organizations but "[t]his was not the intended effect of the
antitrust laws." 6
TYING ARRANGEMENTS AND HOUSING ARRANGEMENTS

In Carl Sandburg Village Condominium Association v. First Condominium Development Co.,61 the Seventh Circuit recognized the per se legality of a tying arrangement where the alleged tying company has
absolutely no economic interest in the sales of the tied seller. The court
affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of a complaint by the district court
(Getzendanner, J.).
The facts were relatively straight forward. In early 1979, the defendants had purchased and converted Carl Sandburg Village from rental
apartments to condominium units. During the conversion process, defendants established condominium associations under their own direction. The associations entered into management agreements with Arthur
Rubloff and Company which had been managing the buildings since
1965. The individual unit owners were indirectly subject to the Condominium Management Agreement with Rubloff by virtue of their status as
members of the associations. The agreements appointed Rubloff as the
managing agent for two years at a fee computed and payable monthly by
each condominium unit.
In 1982, the condominium associations, which were by this time no
longer under the direction of the developers, sued the developers and
57. ECOS Elec., 743 F.2d at 501 (quoting Eliason Corp. v. National Sanitation Found., 614
F.2d 126, 129 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980)).
58. ECOS Elec., 743 F.2d at 501.
59. Id. at 502.
60. Id. at 503.
61. 758 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1985).
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Rubloff in a 9-count complaint alleging a Sherman Act tie-in and various
state claims including breach of fiduciary duty in failing to disclose defects in the buildings, negligent misrepresentation, negligent construction, and a breach of express and implied warranties of workmanship.
The district court dismissed the tie-in claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, on the ground that the tying and tied products are sold by
different, unaffiliated sellers and that the plaintiff failed to allege that the
seller of the tying product received a commission or rebate from the
seller of the tied product. The Seventh Circuit pointed out that in this
circuit "an illegal tying arrangement will not be found where the alleged
tying company has absolutely no economic interest in the sales of the tied
seller, whose products are favored by the tie-in."' 62 The court noted that
this economic interest requirement has also been imposed by courts in
63
the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits.
The court also clarified that this economic interest requirement was an
64
essential element of a Rule of Reason tie-in claim as well.
The Seventh Circuit (per Flaum, J.) rejected plaintiffs' argument
that Rubloff conferred an economic benefit upon the developers (the tying sellers) by concealing defects in the condominium structure, thereby
permitting the developers to sell units at inflated prices. The court rejected plaintiffs' analogizing this concealment of defects to a kickback,
rebate, or commission. In addition, the court pointed out that plaintiffs
had been allowed a full year of discovery on the issue of economic interest because of the difficulty of knowing whether any "secret" rebates or
discounts had been paid. The court pointed out that this discovery
65
yielded no such evidence.

Because the federal cause of action was dismissed for failure to state
a claim, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal without prejudice
66
of the remaining state claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
62. Id. at 207 (citing Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 835 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979)).
63. Carl Sandburg Village Condominium Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 208. See, e.g., Esposito v. Mister
Softee, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,089, at 77,423-24 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1979), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1026 (1984); Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Prod. Co., Inc., 521 F.2d 1309, 1317
(3d Cir. 1975); Miller Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441, 446-47 (4th Cir. 1958); Kenner
v. Sizzler Family Steak Houses, 597 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1979); Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler
Corp., 338 F.2d 934, 939 (6th Cir. 1964); cert. denied, 380 U.S. 954 (1965); Roberts v. Elaine Powers
Figure Salons, Inc., 708 F.2d 1476, 1478-81 (9th Cir. 1983); Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle
House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705, 712 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
64. Carl Sandburg Village Condominium Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 210. See Warner Management
Consultants, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 545 F. Supp. 956, 957 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
65. Carl Sandberg Village Condominium Ass'n, 758 F.2d at 209.
66. Id. at 211.
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TERMINATION OF A DEALER FOR BREACH OF AN EXCLUSIVE
DEALING ARRANGEMENT

In Roland Machinery Company v. Dresser Industries, Inc.,67 Judge
Posner reversed a preliminary injunction enjoining the termination of an
equipment dealer. While the court appeared to enunciate a new standard
for reviewing preliminary injunctions, the principal interest of this case is
its interpretation of exclusive dealing law.
Roland Machinery had for many years been the exclusive dealer in
Central Illinois for International Harvester's line of construction equipment. In 1972, Dresser Industries purchased International Harvester's
construction equipment division. About eight months later, Roland Machinery Company became a dealer for Komatsu, a Japanese manufacturer of a competing line of construction equipment. Shortly thereafter,
Dresser terminated Roland's dealership pursuant to a clause in the agreement which allowed either party to terminate without cause on ninety
days notice. Roland brought suit under Section 3 of the Clayton Act,
and the district court (Ackerman, J.) preliminarily enjoined the
termination.
In reversing the trial court's decision, Judge Posner examined the
"balance of harms" and concluded that the balance was close because the
district court was clearly erroneous in finding a threat to the existence of
plaintiff's business and because it was unlikely that the district court
68
could administer the injunction so as to prevent harm to defendant.
Under the Seventh Circuit's new standards, where the balance of harms
was close, the likelihood of success had to be rather substantial. 69
The Seventh Circuit concluded that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate the necessary likelihood of success on the merits because it had
failed to show either that there was an exclusive agreement or that the
agreement was likely to have a substantial anti-competitive effect. First,
the record did not establish that the parties had reached even an implicit
agreement that Roland could not carry a competing manufacturer's line.
As an aside, Judge Posner noted that even an announced policy of granting only exclusive dealerships and terminating those which violated the
70
policy would not establish the necessary agreement.
In this respect to the anti-competitive effect of the agreement, Judge
Posner stated that plaintiff must prove that the agreement keeps a com67.
68.
69.
70.

749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 392.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 393.
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petitor out of the relevant market and that this exclusion will cause
prices to rise above the competitive level or otherwise injure competition.
Since Komatsu is one of the largest manufacturers of construction equipment in the world and no manufacturer of such equipment has long-term
exclusive dealing agreements, the record on appeal indicated that Komatsu could not be kept out of Central Illinois. Further, he emphasized
the possible competitive benefit of exclusive dealership: that exclusive
dealers may promote a product more vigorously, provide more information and services to the consumer, and are less likely to take a "free ride"
on the manufacturer's promotional efforts. He commented that
"[e]xclusive-dealing contracts terminable in less than a year are presumptively lawful under Section 3."71
Judge Swygert dissented. 72 First, he urged that the abuse of discretion standard should be retained for preliminary injunctions and disagreed with the majority's assessment of the balance of harms, because it
depended on assumptions that lacked any basis in the record. He also
disagreed with the majority's assessment of the likelihood of success, because evidence of defendant's surveillance and incentives to dealers to
deal exclusively implied an exclusive dealing arrangement. He also believed that there was evidence of anti-competitive effect in the relevant
market.
ETHICAL RESTRICTIONS MAY AFFECT PRICE AND STILL BE LEGAL

In Vogel v. American Society of Appraisers,73 the Seventh Circuit upheld expulsion of a gem appraiser from a society of appraisers for "unethical" pricing practices. The district court (McMillen, J.) had denied a
preliminary injunction, and on appeal the denial was affirmed.
The by-laws of the American Society of Appraisers states that "it is
unprofessional and unethical for the appraiser to do work for a fixed percentage of the amount of value.., which he determines at the conclusion
of his work."' 74 Plaintiff Vogel, an experienced gem appraiser, charged a
flat one percentage fee, of the value ultimately determined (subject to a
minimum fee of $10.00). Vogel's expulsion, which was publicized in the
Society's newsletter in March, 1983, caused Vogel to lose referrals from
other Society members and from other appraisers. Vogel brought suit
claiming that the by-law constituted a price-fixing agreement in violation
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 395.
Id. at 396-404.
744 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 599.
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of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and that his expulsion constituted a
boycott of him.
Speaking for the court, Judge Posner found that the prohibition on
fixed-percentage appraisals "seems unrelated or at most very tenuously
related to any purpose or probable consequence of raising the price of
appraisals. ' 75 Rather "it merely outlaws a method of fee setting that
seems to invite the appraiser to practice a fraud on his customer, by first
announcing that his fee is a fixed percentage and then over-appraising the
item; or, at the very least, that invites discrimination against wealthier, or
less sophisticated customers."' 76 Thus, the "challenged by-law is more
likely a praiseworthy effort at self-regulation than a device for facilitating
supracompetitive pricing."' 77 Judge Posner found that while ethical concerns have often and unavailingly been offered as reasons for limiting
price competition, 78 there is no suggestion that the Society's by-laws actually covers an effort to fix prices. 79 Accordingly, the court saw no likelihood of success on the merits.
For the future in the case, Judge Posner commented that, if in the
trial on the merits Vogel can show that abolishing fixed-percentage fees
encourages "the members of the Society to adopt a collusive fee schedule
as a substitute, he will be well on his way to proving a violation of the
statute." 80 Alternatively, Vogel may be able to prove a Rule of Reason
violation by showing that the Society's members as a group have a substantial share of the relevant market and that the anti-competitive effects
of the by-law exceed any pro-competitive effects that the Society may be
able to point to.
TRUCKING ASSOCIATION FALLS AFOUL OF ToPco RULE

In General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing ,lssociation,81
the court affirmed a preliminary injunction enjoining practices which
constituted a horizontal market allocation.
The National Truck Leasing Association is composed of companies
that lease trucks to businesses on a "full service" basis, i.e., with an understanding that the lessor of the trucks is responsible for servicing the
trucks either himself or by others. This service aspect is particularly crit75. Id. at 602.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 603.

78. Id. at 602. See also National Soc'y of Professional Eng'r v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
693-96 (1978).
79. Vogel, 744 F.2d at 602-03.
80. Id. at 603.
81. 744 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1984).
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ical for "over the road" rentals since a truck may break down hundreds
of miles from the lessor's place of business and require immediate service.
In order to compete with nationwide truck rental companies, Association
members agree to provide reciprocal service to one another when their
trucks break down out of their own service area.
The antitrust controversy arose because the Association assigns each
member a location in which it may do business and forbids that member
from doing business as an Association franchisee elsewhere. It also further prohibits that franchisee from affiliating with any nationwide truck
leasing company such as Hertz or Avis. Thus, the members may not
compete against one another as Association franchisees because reciprocal service is unavailable to one operating from an unauthorized location.
Nor may an Association franchisee compete outside its assigned territory
by obtaining servicing rights through the Hertz or Avis network. General Leaseways, an expansion-minded franchisee, defied the rules and
sued to avoid expulsion.
For antitrust purposes, the most significant portion of the court's
opinion was that of dealing with probability of success on the merits.
The court (per Posner, J.) noted the similarities to Topco and Sealy, and
recognized that the law may have shifted, but rejected the Association's
free rider arguments as weak. The Association's basic argument was that
members forego extortionate prices for service and thus that an expansion-minded franchisee rides "free" on the others by making too many
service calls. Judge Posner rejected this, both because the expanded franchisee also will have to do more repairs and because there is no evidence
82
that members do not charge fully remunerative fees for repairs.
The court further noted that the prohibition on competition here
was basically horizontal and that, unlike ASCAP/BMI,83 no unique market was being created. Moreover, unlike NCAA, 84 the restriction here
was not merely ancilliary to the proper purposes of the Association and
thus subject to the Rule of Reason, rather the evidence at the injunction
hearing suggested the per se rule was applicable.
Finally, on a Rule of Reason analysis, in light of the fact that it is
difficult to enter the trucking business due both to federal regulation and
the need for reciprocal service, Judge Posner would not hold that the
district court (McGarr, C.J.) erred in finding that the restrictions General Leaseways defied have a substantial anti-competitive potential.
82. Id. at 592.
83. Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
84. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 104 S. Ct. 2948
(1984).
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Judge Posner stated that "[t]his finding is dispositive under the Rule of
Reason because the Association's attempted justification based on freerider problems is unpersuasive."' 5
STATE ACTION AND HEALTH CARE

In Marrese v. Interqual, Inc.,86 the court held that the State Action
Doctrine immunized the revocation of clinical privileges at an Indiana
hospital. The court affirmed dismissal by the district court (Leighton, J.)
of a complaint charging a Section 1 violation and a claim of monopolization of the spinal surgery market in Evansville, Indiana. The district
court, however, had not considered the State Action issue but rather had
dismissed the complaint on the grounds of insufficient effect on interstate
commerce.
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision on interstate commerce. In light of the new and vastly expanded interpretation
of the interstate commerce requirement under the Sherman Act generally
adopted by the federal courts, the Seventh Circuit held that it was sufficient for plaintiff to allege that, in the course of his practice, he
purchased supplies and services from out-of-state sources and received
revenues from the federal medicare and medicaid programs as well as
out-of-state insurance companies. 87 Plaintiff also alleged that the majority of his patients came from outside of Indiana. Plaintiff further alleged
that twenty-five percent of the patients at the hospital at issue (Deaconess
Hospital) came from outside Indiana and that the hospital purchased
88 It
$5,000,000 in supplies and equipment from out-of-state sources.
should be noted that the court expressly declined to rule whether a plaintiff can rely on the interstate activities of defendant alone to meet the
interstate commerce requirement. 89
The Seventh Circuit nevertheless affirmed the dismissal based on its
own analysis of the State Action Exemption. The court ordered the issue
of State Action to be briefed on appeal. The court noted that Indiana
statutes specifically require that hospitals engage in medical staff peer
review to review the quality and necessity of care for patients. a0 The
court considered this a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
...state policy" and held that it was "actively supervised" by the State
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

General Leaseways, 744 F.2d at 597.
748 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 3501 (1985).
Id. at 383.
Id. at 380.
Id. at 383 n. 16.
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of Indiana which had formed two regulatory agencies to promulgate and
enforce standards of competent medical practice by physicians and hospitals. 9 1 Both agencies review the records of medical peer review committees. The court also noted that Indiana statutes provide that
participants in the medical peer review process shall be immune from
civil liability. 92 Finally, it was noted that under the Indiana statutory
scheme, "any practitioner investigated by a medical peer review committee shall receive the due process safeguard of an evidentiary hearing
before any disclosure of the committee's findings" and that physicians
who lost privileges may challenge the "good faith" of the hospital staff
93
and its applicable fair hearing procedure in Indiana courts.
In the instant case, after conducting an independent audit of plaintiff's medical practice, defendant Interqual had recommended to the Special Ad Hoc Committee at the hospital that plaintiff's clinical privileges
at Deaconess be revoked. The committee forwarded Interqual's recommendation to the Medical Staff Executive Council at Deaconess which
adopted the recommendation.
The court (per Coffey, J.) emphasized the need to balance federal
and state interests, noting that Indiana has an important interest in the
protection of its citizens through the medical peer review process. Permitting a Sherman Act attack on this process would destroy it by inducing physicians to avoid participation, the court believed. 94 The court
further stated that allowing antitrust litigation would increase the cost of
medical care to consumers and that the plaintiff is protected by due pro95
cess safeguards of hearings and state court review.
The decision is an unprecedented one in its application of the State
Action Doctrine to the health care field. Whether it will be applied by
other courts has yet to be seen.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES RELATED TO ANTITRUST CASES

The Seventh Circuit has considered interesting procedural issues in
connection with three antitrust cases recently: the A T&T-MCI case, the
96
Folding Carton case, and the Dunlop-Wilson tennis ball case.
In January 1983, the Seventh Circuit set aside a $1.8 billion judgment in favor of MCI Communications Corporation and remanded the
91. Id.
92. Id. at 391.
93. Id. at 392.
94. Id. at 394.
95. Id.
96. See infra notes 97, 101 and 110.
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case for retrial on the amount of damages that MCI had suffered as a
result of AT&T's antitrust violations. 97 On remand, MCI proposed to
introduce a "lost profits" study that purported to show MCI's damages
based upon lost revenue from its public long-distance services known as
Execunet and Network Service. AT&T filed a motion in limine to exclude the study, contending both that MCI had represented at the first
trial that public line service damages were not at issue and that the Seventh Circuit's 1983 decision precluded MCI from attempting to recover
such damages.
The district court (Grady, J.) denied AT&T's motion, but permitted
AT&T to seek an interlocutory appeal. The Seventh Circuit denied
AT&T's petition for permission to appeal. 9 8 The court declined to exercise its discretion to accept the appeal for several reasons. First, the
question of whether MCI's prior statements or the 1983 decision precluded MCI from raising public line service damage claims were difficult
issues which could be more adequately addressed on a full record after
trial. The court in its per curiam decision also pointed out that the
chance of a third trial being required if it were later held error to admit
the public line service evidence could be minimized by the district court's
use of special verdict forms or jury interrogatories so that the amount of
any damages awarded in connection with lost profits of Execunet or Network Service would be stated in the verdict. Judge Cudahy dissented in
part, arguing that the court had an obligation to address the "wholly
unanticipated" set of circumstances about which the 1983 mandate was
silent. 99
At the time the court considered the matter, the potential significance of the admission of MCI's public line service evidence was great.
Under the challenged lost profits study, MCI's damages would be approximately $5 billion before trebling in contrast to the $900 million
claimed at the first trial. As it turned out, however, the Seventh Circuit
spared itself some unnecessary legal analysis. The study was admitted at
the retrial; however, the jury apparently gave it little credence and
awarded MCI treble damages totalling only $113 million on May 28,
1985. On November 18, 1985, MCI and AT&T announced a settlement
of their 11-year old antitrust dispute." 00
The Seventh Circuit's decision in In re Folding Carton Antitrust Liti97. MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
98. American Tel. & Tel. v. MCI Communications Corp., 748 F.2d 799 (7th Cir. 1984).
99. Id. at 802.
100. New York Times, Nov. 19, 1985, § D, Page 6, at Col. 4.
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gation, 10 1 brings to a close the lengthy litigation surrounding allegations
of price fixing in the folding carton industry. On September 19, 1979, the
district court (Robson and Will, JJ.) entered a final judgment approving
a settlement agreement providing for payment by the 25 defendants of
$200 million into a fund for distribution to the plaintiff class. The settlement agreement provided for a cut-off date for claims but made no provision for disposition of any sums left in the fund. By 1982, approximately
$6 million dollars was left undistributed. The fund's Administration
Committee (composed principally of plaintiffs' counsel) recommended to
the court that the remaining funds be used to establish a private "antitrust development and research foundation" to promote the study of
complex litigation and various substantive and procedural aspects of antitrust law. Various class members and defendants objected, urging that
the fund be distributed to the plaintiff class or otherwise pro rata to the
settling defendants. The district court accepted the Administration
Committee's recommendation.10 2 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed and held that the reserve fund shall escheat to the United States
subject to the conditions expressed in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2041 and 2042.103
The Seventh Circuit first rejected the appropriateness of utilizing the
"fluid recovery concept."' 0 4 Because the defendants had been sufficiently
deterred, have disgorged illegally obtained profits, and have satisfied the
compensatory factor of the Sherman Act, fluid recovery is not needed. 10 5
The court (per Cummings, C.J.) held that establishment of the proposed
Foundation would be "carrying coals to Newcastle" because of the "voluminous research with respect to multi district antitrust litigation and
the substantive and procedural aspects of the antitrust laws by judges,
lawyer specialists, law schools, bar associations," and governmental entities. 10 6 In the Seventh Circuit's view, establishing "an unneeded foundation for these purposes . . . would be a miscarriage of justice and an
abuse of discretion."' 1 7 Rather, the funds should escheat to the United
States Government because the "spirit" of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2041-42 is "certainly satisfied and indeed the technical Congressional requirements pres10 8
ent no real obstacles."'
101. 744 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 11 (1985).
102. In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 557 F. Supp. 1091 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd, 744
F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 11 (1985).
103, Folding Carton, 744 F.2d at 1256.
104. See Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 675-77 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917 (1982).
105. Folding Carton, 744 F.2d at 1254.
106. Id. at 1254-55.
107. Id. at 1255.
108. Id.
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Judge Flaum dissented in part, contending that the fund should escheat to the state, in the same proportion as the citizenship of the plaintiff class members as the "parens patriae" representatives of non-claiming
class members. 09
Finally, the Seventh Circuit dealt with the always embarrassing issue of judicial recusal in the Dunlop-Wilson tennis ball case. In Dunlop
Tire and Rubber Corp. v. Pepsico, Inc.," 1 ° Dunlop claimed that Wilson
had attempted to monopolize the tennis ball industry through the use of
predatory pricing. After several years of discovery, the trial was set to
commence before the district court (McMillen, J.) in June, 1985. On the
very eve of trial, a situation arose which appeared to call for the recusal
of the judge. Judge McMillen denied the recusal motion, and an immediate petition for a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 was filed
with the Seventh Circuit. The trial began before the district court, but
was terminated after four days when the Seventh Circuit ordered the
judge to recuse himself."'
The district judge had reached retirement age some months prior to
the events in question, and, though taking senior status, decided to explore the possibility of resigning from the bench and resuming the practice of law. To this end, he contacted a "headhunter" who agreed to
contact various Chicago law firms to see whether any of them might be
interested in employing him. Whether authorized to or not, the headhunter called both of the law firms involved in the litigation. The law
firm representing defendant stated that it was not interested. What the
other law firm representing plaintiff did is less clear. The Seventh Circuit
made clear that there would be "no actual impropriety" if the district
judge was allowed to continue to preside over the trial. 1 2 Nevertheless,
the Seventh Circuit "reluctantly" concluded that recusal was required
because of the appearance of partiality that would be created by his continuing to preside in the case." 3 Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code requires a federal judge to recuse himself "in a proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned," and the Seventh Circuit
has read this to require recusal whenever there is "a reasonable basis" for
a finding of an "appearance of partiality under the facts and circum109. Id. at 1256-59.
110. Dunlop Tire and Rubber Corp. v. Pepsico, Inc., No. 81 C. 7079, slip op. (N.D. Ill. July 31,
1985).
111. Pepsico, Inc. and Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Honorable Thomas R. McMillan, 764 F.2d
458 (7th Cir. 1985).
112. Id. at 460.
113. Id.

ANTITRUST DECISIONS

stances" of the case. 1 4 Judge Posner writing for the panel concluded that
"an objective disinterested observer . . . would entertain a significant
doubt that justice would be done in the case" because of the "asymmetrical" responses of the two firms to the headhunters inquiry.' 5 Beyond
that, Judge Posner stated "[t]he appearance of equal justice requires that
the judge not be exploring the prospects of employment with one lawyer
' 6
or all lawyers appearing in a case before him." "
CONCLUSION

Judge Posner wrote a number of the court's antitrust decisions in
the 1984-85 term, but it does not appear that his views are substantially
different from his colleagues. The court is conservative in antitrust matters but not because it is located near the "Chicago School" of
economics.

114. See SCA Services, Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 116 (7th Cir. 1977).
115. Pepsico, 764 F.2d at 460-61.
116. Id. at 461.

